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In this paper, we investigate the agglomeration patterns in a New Economic Geography
model when commuting is allowed. The introduction of both commuting and housing
costs leads to a disentangling of the agglomeration of firms and people. Commuting al-
lows workers to continue living in agglomerations and enjoying the benefits of a larger
product variety, despite high housing costs, since they may choose to commute to another
place where they receive higher wages, which in turn enables them to cover high housing
costs at their place of living. This observation is especially true for skilled workers, who
generally are more mobile than unskilled workers.
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1 Introduction
At London’s highly frequented Victoria Station, in 2008, about 70,000 passengers entered the
underground during the morning peak on average. About 80 million people were using just this
single underground station in that year. By 2016, Transport for London expects this number
to increase up to 100 million annual passengers at Victoria1. The New York City Transit has
over 7.4 million daily passengers on average in its network in New York City in 20082. De
Bruyne (2006) finds that about 50% of the working population in Belgium commute to work
into another municipality than the one of residence, and about 27% of the working population
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commute into another district. As these empirical facts suggest, commuting is necessary for
many people for getting to work, but also for shopping or leisure activities. Thus we should care
about those huge daily flows of people and investigate how they affect the economic landscape,
the location of jobs (hence firms), and the economic ’evolution’ of regions. In this sense, the
present paper takes up a suggestion by Fujita and Krugman (2004), and tries to contribute to
integrate urban features such as commuting into geographical models.
Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) note that commuting costs are of decisive importance for the
spatial shape of the economy, since transport costs have reached quite low levels nowadays. Of
course, the ’pure’ commuting costs have declined, just as transport costs did. But accounting
for the time spent in commuting and its associated costs, they still remain quite substantial (see
Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). Anas (2000) found that decreasing commuting costs may at least
partly account for the increasing trend towards urban agglomeration, despite large population
growth. In a study on the San Francisco Bay Area, Cervero and Wu (1998) find that commuting
has gained its importance not only through falling costs, but also because of job decentraliza-
tion, i.e., a relocation of firms away from the center into more suburban areas.
As to migration, especially in Europe both international and interregional migration rates
are quite low. Puga (1999) notes that in the EU only about 1% of the workers work outside
their member state of origin. In a study on labor markets and the European currency union,
Eichengreen (1993) estimated the elasticity of interregional migration with respect to the ratio
of local wages to the national average to be about 25 times higher in the US than in the UK, and
found an even larger difference, for instance, to Italy.
This paper accounts for these two different types of mobility for getting to work by incor-
porating commuting into a New Economic Geography (NEG) setting, while maintaining the
usual mobility assumption (i.e., migration) for workers (see, e.g., Krugman 1991b; Fujita et
al., 1999). We show that the agglomeration of industries and people (who are both, workers
and consumers) may be disentangled, and now displays different intensities as measured by
their relative regional shares. In particular, the agglomeration of people remains rather similar
compared to the standard NEG-setting, whereas the agglomeration of production activities be-
comes less pronounced. This is due to the two main features of the model, (i) the possibility to
commute as an additional type of mobility, and (ii) the introduction of housing and commuting
costs for workers.
By including commuting and its associated costs, in connection with housing costs, we
establish a link to the ample urban economics literature (such as Abdel-Rahman and Anas,
2004; Fujita, 1998; or Fujita and Thisse, 2002 for an overview). In this field of research, urban
costs (represented by commuting costs) and housing costs play decisive roles in determining
the location of residential zones, the central business district (CBD), or the development of sub-
centers within cities. Compared to the urban economics approach, and for a better intuition, the
idea of the present paper is to look at a slightly larger geographic scale, i.e., at regions or cities
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(municipalities) located sufficiently close to each other, where both migration and commuting
may turn out to be feasible3.
Previous NEG-literature has only paid rather scant attention to commuting in its theoreti-
cal models. Ottaviano et al. (2002) introduce an analytically solvable modelling framework,
which departs from the love-of-variety specification following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and in-
stead turns to a quasi-linear utility function, where love-of-variety is introduced by a quadratic
subutility function. They show that commuting following the urban economics literature (see
Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004, for an overview) can be incorporated into this setting. Ot-
taviano et al. (2002) find that any positive commuting costs lead to divergence provided that
transport costs are low enough, and that high commuting costs always lead to dispersion of both
firms and population. Additionally, agglomeration becomes less optimal as commuting costs
rise.
Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) provide a model-setup, where they force consumer-workers to
commute in order to get to work. They use a model with three factors, one homogenous and
costlessly tradable good, a horizontally differentiated manufacturing good, and land (or hous-
ing). Similarly to Ottaviano et al. (2002), each consumer-worker consumes one unit of land and
has to commute to the CBD to work at some cost, whereas firms are not assumed to consume
land. However, Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) disregard the agricultural sector but include urban
costs as a dispersion force. Also product differentiation acts as a dispersion force when all con-
sumers are mobile, whereas price competition is exactly the opposite and fosters agglomeration
since workers have to be compensated for the higher urban costs of living centrally. Addition-
ally, in Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) commodity-specific transport costs may lead to equilibria
where one sector is agglomerated and the other one partially dispersed. In general, high trans-
port costs lead to agglomeration.
Murata and Thisse (2005) aim at a similar objective, employing the same modelling frame-
work. Here, people live in two cities, where they have to commute into the CBD for work.
People may choose to migrate into the other city whenever they can achieve a higher indirect
utility. Murata and Thisse (2005) show that the standard NEG-results that high transport costs
for goods lead to agglomeration (as in Fujita et al., 1999; Krugman, 1991b) may be reversed,
as commuting costs are introduced. Now, high transport costs and low commuting costs lead
to agglomeration, whereas high transport costs for goods lead to dispersion of both people and
firms across the two cities. Agglomeration is also sustainable for low values of transport costs
provided that commuting costs are also sufficiently low. These effects arise through the inter-
play of both, transport and commuting costs. In the Murata and Thisse (2005) setting, workers
3Note that the introduction of commuting in this paper is similar to the urban economics approach (i.e.,
workers getting from their place of living to their place of work), and we sort of add this feature into
a NEG-model. From an urban economics perspective, we add the opportunity for workers to move to
another place, city, or region.
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benefit from being agglomerated by saving on transport costs for the goods but have fewer
varieties, whereas being dispersed has opposite effects.
In a more urban economics oriented framework, Mascarilla Miro and Yegorov (2005) aim
at creating a model of an optimal city with respect to size as a function of urban costs and
benefits by taking into account commuter flows and migration. Since commuting has become
very attractive for people due to reduced costs, they find that one may never be able to find
a long-run stable equilibrium configuration of city size. The presence of some migration and
commuter flows is an indication for an asymmetric equilibrium.
Another important property of commuting is that it may act like a safety valve for high
housing costs close to the place of work. If the costs of living more remotely plus the commuting
costs (including transport, time, etc.) are below the housing costs of living centrally, it pays off
to live more apart from the center and to commute. Commuting costs plus the associated time
spent in commuting are frequently referred to as urban costs (see for instance Tabuchi and
Thisse, 2006). This, of course, releases some pressure off the housing market in the center (see,
e.g., Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998). However, commuting can cause negative welfare-effects
(congestion effects), if it causes delays, traffic jams, or environmental damage4.
Again, we want to emphasize that our model is capable of dealing with those two important
properties of commuting, i.e. being (i) an alternative to migration, and (ii) a means to cope
with housing costs. Our analysis shows that the different types of mobility of people (move,
commute, stay) yield core-periphery patterns which depart from standard NEG-predictions in
the sense that the agglomeration of firms becomes less pronounced than that of people. This is a
consequence of the introduction of commuting as an additional way of being mobile. Commut-
ing allows workers to continue living in agglomerations and enjoying the benefits of a larger
product variety, despite high housing costs, since they may choose to commute to another place
(another region) where they receive higher net-of-commuting-costs wages, which in turn en-
ables them to cover the high housing costs at their place of living. This observation is especially
true for skilled workers, who generally are more mobile than unskilled workers. In contrast to
the previously cited literature, consumers/workers are not forced to commute in the present
model, but they may do so if they find it rational. Hence, a worker/consumer has three options
of being mobile − to move, to commute, or to stay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Sec-
tion 3 briefly lines out the analyses being conducted. Sections 4−6 analyze the core-periphery
patterns, the influence of commuting on industry-shares, and its effects on the agglomeration
of firms and people for our three basic scenarios, which are unskilled labor mobility, skilled
labor mobility and the mobility of both types of workers. Finally, we turn to investigate the
robustness of our model (Section 7), while the last Section summarizes and concludes.
4A good example for such a situation is the city of Atlanta (GA), where average commutes are quite long
(34 miles or about 55km) and the rush-our lasts more or less all day long (The Economist, 1999b). Also in
Chicago, 11% of the population commute at least 60 minutes to work one way (The Economist, 1999a).
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2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are two regions, referred to as regions 1 and 2, and indexed as {i, j} = {1, 2}. In order
to obtain a good sketch of the regions’ economies in the model, both regions produce three
goods, Z, X and D, reflecting the three main economic sectors. Z is a homogenous agricultural
good produced at constant returns to scale by a competitive industry. X-goods (manufacturing
goods) are differentiated in the usual Dixit-Stiglitz-fashion (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Firms
may sell on the local market and export to the other region, where the number of firms from
region i is denoted by ni. Therefore, Xi j are the exports of region i-based firms to region j.5 Xic
denotes the consumption of X in region i, being a CES aggregate of the individual varieties. D
are homogenous, non-tradable and region-specific services produced competitively at constant
returns to scale. Dnci denotes the services consumed and produced in region i by non-commuters,
and Dcii +Dcij is the amount of services consumed by commuters from region i, who are allowed
to allocate a fraction (δ) of their income spent on services to buy services at their place of work
(Dcij ) − imagine going to the hairdresser’s or eat lunch at the place of work. The remaining
fraction of income devoted to services consumption, 1 − δ, is spent at the place of living (Dcii ).
The utility of region i (Ui) can thus be formulated as follows:
Ui = Xαi
[
Dnci +
(
Dcii + D
ci
j
)]β (
Zii + Z ji
)1−α−β
,
Xic ≡
[
ni (Xii) σ−1σ + n j
(
X ji
1 + τ
) σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where α denotes the Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for differentiated products, β the one for
services, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the manufactured good.
We assume that Z-goods are costlessly tradable across regions, whereas X-goods trade incurs
iceberg transport costs (τ), which are symmetric for either direction of shipment. In terms
of quantity, one unit of consumption of an X-variety in region j requires a firm in i to send
(1 + τ) units. For convenience, quantities of X are defined as firm-specific productions for the
respective foreign market.
As usual, the consumer’s maximization problem can be solved in two steps. In the first step,
each variety X ji needs to be chosen such that it minimizes the cost of attaining Xic, whatever the
consumption of Xic is. In the second step, consumers allocate income between the Z-good, the
services (D), and the composite X-good. Let p ji be the price of an X-variety in region i produced
by a firm in region j. The price for the homogenous agricultural good, qi, is indexed once, since
all (indigenous and foreign) homogenous goods consumed at a single location i must face the
same price qi. Similarly, the price of services, ri, is equal no matter whether local residents
or inward-commuters consume services in region i. We take q1 as the nume´raire. Further, Pi
5Whenever we use i and j from the set {1, 2}, this implies that i , j.
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denotes the price aggregator, defined as the minimum cost of buying one unit of Xi at prices p ji
of an individual variety:
Pi = min
X ji
∑
i, j
p jiX ji s.t. Xi = 1. (2)
The first-stage budgeting problem leads to:
X ji = (p ji)−σPσ−1i αYi ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
where Yi denotes total expenditures of consumers in region i, and p ji = p j (1 + τ), i.e., the
local goods price in region j (p j) including transport costs (1 + τ). Identical price elasticities
of demand and identical marginal costs (technologies) within a region ensure that the price of a
locally produced manufacturing good is equal to the mill price for exports. Hence, prices of all
manufacturing goods produced in one region are equal in equilibrium. pi denotes the price of
all goods produced in region i. With these assumptions, the price aggregator Pi of differentiated
goods consumed in region i can be written as
Pi =
[
ni p1−σi + n j
(
(1 + τ)p j
)1−σ] 11−σ
. (4)
The second-stage budgeting yields the division of expenditures among the three sectors:
Xi =
α
Pi
Yi, (5)
Dnci + D
ci
i + D
ci
j =
β
ri
Yi (6)
Zii + Z ji =
1 − α − β
qi
Yi (7)
2.2 Commuters
The basic idea is to look at commuting across cities or regions, which means that we are look-
ing at two neighboring regions where an individual may consider it as feasible and rational to
commute on a daily basis. Workers living in region i will decide to commute if their nominal
wage net of commuting costs in region j is larger than their nominal wage in region i.
The set of strategies of mobility patterns available for consumers/workers in the present
model is as follows (see also Figure 1): Firstly, workers decide where to work by comparing
net-of-commuting costs wages, and secondly where to live by comparing real wages across
regions. In other words, people first look for a job and then decide where to live. Hence, the
integration of commuting into this paper sort of precedes the standard Krugman-type mobility
decision, and probably reflects the usual mobility pattern of people, at least in Europe: before
moving to another city for a new job, one decides to commute and continues living at the same
place. Following this basic decision logic, three options arise:6 (i) live and work in region
6Figure 1 shows these options, from the left until the vertical line in the diagram.
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Figure 1: Decision Tree for Consumer’s/Worker’s Mobility.
 Li> Lj
stay if
wLi>wLj(1- )
wLj>wLi(1- )stay if
stay if
 Li< Lj
migrate if
wLi<wLj(1- ) < (1  )
commute if
commute back if
wLj wLi -
1, (ii) live in region 1 and commute to region 2 for work, (iii) move to region 2 and work
there. Intuitively, there is a fourth strategy for consumers/workers7, which would require a
two-period model to be fully captured. The main reason is that the standard NEG-model looks
at instantaneous changes of equilibria, and not at adjustment process between two long-run
stable equilibria. The decision to move away from the home region 1 into region 2 and then
to commute back into region 1 for work would require to look at this adjustment process. In
other words, this strategy involves two decision processes of the kind lined out in the previous
paragraph. On the other hand, the remaining three strategies (move, commute, stay), which are
the ones being addressed in the paper, only require to run through one such decision process. In
the paper, we do not address this fourth possible strategy explicitly, since we cannot track this
possibility within our model8.
Let wLi, wS i and wTi denote the factor rewards for unskilled labor, skilled labor, and land in
region i, respectively. In region i, the group of Li + S i workers, is split into people who live and
work in i (Lii + S ii), and people who live in i but commute to work into region j (Li j + S i j)9.
Commuters incur some iceberg-type commuting costs, γ, reducing their wage, such that the
wage net of commuting costs for a commuter from i to j is (1−γ)wL j or (1−γ)wS j, respectively.
7Figure 1 shows also this option, to the right of the vertical line in the diagram.
8The decision of once having moved from region 2 and then to commute back into region 1 would also
feed back into to remaining process of workers deciding where to work and to live, and might thus lead
decisions taken by others to be not optimal and hence also no long-run stable equilibrium.
9The first subscript denotes the place of living, the second subscript the place of work of people.
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Hence, the commuting conditions for skilled and unskilled workers are as follows:
wLi ≥ wL j (1 − γ) ⊥ Li j ≥ 0, (8)
wS i ≥ wS j (1 − γ) ⊥ S i j ≥ 0, (9)
where ⊥ indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with equality. The
commuters live in their home region (Li j and S i j in region i, L ji and S ji in region j), cover
their housing costs there, and spend most of their income in their home region. Recall that
commuters are also allowed to spend a fraction (δ) of their income devoted to services (β) in
their region of work.
In order to cover the workers’ need for housing space, they consume one unit of immobile
land (Ti). Hence, the associated housing costs are wTi. Workers spend their money where they
live, which means that the amount of people buying goods in region i is Li + S i plus the net of
the inward and outward commuters’ fraction of income spent at the place of work for services.
The number of people employed in region i is Lii+S ii+L ji+S ji, i.e., workers living and working
in i, plus inward commuters, i.e., workers commuting from region j into region i.
However, the commuting-decision alone would imply that either all workers commute or
all workers do not. The corresponding centrifugal force comes from the requirement that all
workers incur housing costs in terms of the immobile factor land (Ti). We will return to this in
more detail in the next section. As in the standard NEG-models, we of course also allow for the
usual opportunity of migration between regions according to higher real wages.
2.3 Factor Markets, Production and Income
Assuming that Z-production only uses land (T ), variable unit costs (i.e., marginal costs) cZi
satisfy
cZi ≥ wTi ⊥ Zii ≥ 0, (10)
This implies
cZi ≥ q j ⊥ Zi j ≥ 0. (11)
D-production is also perfectly competitive, but with each firm producing under a CES tech-
nology, using unskilled (L) and skilled (S ) labor (where ’b’ is the coefficient for S and ’1 − b’
for L), with a technical rate of substitution of 1/(1 − ρ) (−∞ < ρ < 1). The region specific
unit input coefficient for the two factors of D-production can be derived by cost minimization
subject to this CES technology:
aS di =
(
wS i
b
) 1
ρ−1

(
w
ρ
S i
b
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
w
ρ
Li
1 − b
) 1
ρ−1

− 1
ρ
(12)
aLdi =
(
wLi
1 − b
) 1
ρ−1

(
w
ρ
S i
b
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
w
ρ
Li
1 − b
) 1
ρ−1

− 1
ρ
(13)
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There is monopolistic competition in the X-sector, and again each firm produces under a
CES technology, using unskilled labor and land (T ) (where ’a’ is the coefficient for L and
’1 − a’ for T ), with a technical rate of substitution of 1/(1 − ρ) (−∞ < ρ < 1). As all firms
face the same factor prices and the CES technology is homothetic, all firms in a region face the
same unit input coefficients. The region specific unit input coefficients for the two factors of
X-production can be derived by cost minimization subject to this CES technology:
aLxi =
(
wLi
a
) 1
ρ−1

(
w
ρ
Li
a
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
w
ρ
Ti
1 − a
) 1
ρ−1

− 1
ρ
(14)
aT xi =
(
wTi
1 − a
) 1
ρ−1

(
w
ρ
Li
a
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
w
ρ
Ti
1 − a
) 1
ρ−1

− 1
ρ
(15)
Additionally, X-sector firms require unskilled labor (aLni) and land to set up plants (aTni),
leading to increasing returns to scale in production.
Factor market clearing in region i for labor (Li, S i) and land (Ti) requires
Lii + L ji(1 − γ) ≥ aLxi
(
niXii + niXi j
)
+ aLnini +
aLdi(Dnci + Dc ji + Dcii ) ⊥ wLi ≥ 0, (16)
S ii + S ji(1 − γ) ≥ aS di(Dnci + Dc ji + Dcii ) ⊥ wS i ≥ 0, (17)
Ti ≥ aT xi
(
niXii + niXi j
)
+ Zii + Zi j +
aTnini + Li + S i ⊥ wTi ≥ 0. (18)
Variable unit costs of producing an X-variety in region i are given by cXi = aLxiwLi+aT xiwTi.
There is a fixed markup over variable costs, which is determined by the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. Given that under CES-utility demand for all varieties is positive, we may
write
pi = cXi
σ
σ − 1
. (19)
Free entry implies that firms earn zero profits, since operating profits are used to cover fixed
costs. The corresponding zero profit condition determines the numbers of firms.
Firms in i have to bear fixed costs of FCni = aLniwLi + aTniwTi. The zero profit condition,
therefore, implies
FCni ≥
pi
(
Xii + Xi j
)
σ
⊥ ni ≥ 0. (20)
All factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income (i.e., GNP) net of com-
muting and housing costs in region i is given by
Yi =
[
wLiLii + wL j(1 − γ)Li j
]
+
[
wS iS ii + wS j(1 − γ)S i j
]
−
wTi(Li + S i) + wTiTi (21)
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The first two RHS-terms in square parenthesis constitute the income of all workers of each type
living in region i, the third term captures the housing costs of workers, and the last term is
the factor income of land. The equivalence of total factor income (Yi, Y j) and demand in each
region implicitly balances payments between regions.
Real factor rewards (ω) are normalized by region-specific costs of living,
P−αi r
−β
i q
α+β−1
i , and are thus given by:
ωki = wkiP−αi r
−β
i q
α+β−1
i , k ∈ {L, S , T } . (22)
3 Analyzing the Model
In contrast to the standard NEG-models a` la Krugman (1991b), production of the manufacturing
good uses two input factors (L and T ). In those models it is straightforward to assume that the
factor used in the manufacturing sector is mobile across regions. In line with the literature, all
factors are immobile in the short run. In the long run, we investigate situations where either
L (intensively used in the manufacturing goods production), S (intensively used in services)
or both types of labor are mobile. In addition to the standard mobility assumption in terms of
migration, we include commuting in our analysis. In practice, this means that region i - workers
may choose to either (i) live and work at the same place (region i), (ii) live in region i and
commute to region j, or (iii) move to region j to live and work there.
Based on the wage net of commuting costs, workers decide whether to commute or not.
Those workers who do not commute are then left with the choice whether to migrate or not,
which is decided by the real wage differential between the two regions (see also Figure 1). A
long run equilibrium is defined similar to Krugman (1991b) by real wage equalization across
regions (ωLi = ωL j if unskilled labor is mobile, ωS i = ωS j if skilled labor is mobile, and
ωLi = ωL j ∧ ωS i = ωS j when both types of labor are mobile). The stability of this equilibrium
is analyzed by exogenously reallocating one unit of unskilled or skilled labor, respectively,
to the other region, and deriving the new short run equilibrium. Then, firms are allowed to
enter and exit to avoid losses and to exploit profits. If this reallocation of labor results in a
decline of the corresponding real wages in the immigration country, the initial equilibrium is
stable. Otherwise, the initial equilibrium is unstable, because even more workers would have
an incentive to migrate.
As already lined out briefly, we want to focus on the differences in the development of the
agglomeration of firms and people. In our model, this becomes possible through the introduc-
tion of commuting and housing costs. That means, workers may find it worthwhile to commute
to the other region and receive a higher wage there (i.e., net of commuting costs), and to con-
tinue to live in their home region. The higher wage may enable them to stay in their home
region even when housing costs are higher than in the other region, as long as their disposable
income for consuming goods is still positive after deducting housing costs. This feature of the
model reflects the frequent observation, that people tend to be more reluctant to migrate than to
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commute when deciding where to work (particularly in Europe). Consequently, it becomes pos-
sible that the one-to-one relationship between the agglomeration of firms and people in standard
NEG-models becomes disentangled to a certain extent. Hence, standard reasoning that workers
follow firms and firms follow workers may not hold in this model. Put differently, these three
options for people to decide on where to live and to work also reflect different degrees of mo-
bility in general (stay, commute, or migrate), notwithstanding that all three decisions may be
rational in equilibrium.
In our model, we analyze three different mobility settings. We always allow both types
of labor to commute, and with respect to migration, we either allow L or S separately to be
mobile (in order to reach comparability to the existing NEG-literature), and finally investigate
simultaneous migration of S and L. For all the scenarios analyzed, we let transport and com-
muting costs vary between 1% and 99% of the goods price and the nominal wage, respectively.
Of course, as the commuting costs approach 100% of the nominal wage, commuting reaches
zero10.
The following analyses show three different things. The bifurcation diagrams illustrating
the core-periphery patterns depict the places of living of people. For each of these bifurcation
diagrams, we provide the corresponding diagrams of the industry shares per sector per region (as
percentages of production volumes), and of the commuters (as percentages of the population).
Combining these three features within each of the following scenarios enables us to identify the
places of living and the places of work of the population, as well as the distribution of economic
activities (i.e., production volumes) across regions11.
4 Scenario 1: Unskilled Labor Migration
4.1 Agglomeration of People
This first scenario is the one which is most closely comparable to the two-sector and two-
factor NEG-models following Krugman (1991a,b). This is because we are now looking at the
mobility of the production factor which is intensively used in manufacturing. Thus, in the case
of unskilled labor mobility, we obtain an agglomeration pattern which shows some similarities
to Puga’s (1999) bell-shaped agglomeration pattern. In our model, only the bifurcation diagrams
of the resulting core-periphery patterns show similarities to Puga (1999), while the underlying
10We have chosen the following parameter values for our simulations: σ = 4, α = 0.4, β = 0.55,
a = b = 0.6, ρ = −10, L = L1+L2 = 100, S = S 1+S 2 = 30, T = T1+T2 = 400, with the immobile factors
being equally distributed across regions, unless anything else is mentioned. Note that we have chosen the
income-expenditure shares for each sector such that they roughly correspond to modern industrialized
and service-oriented economies. For simplicity, we assume γ and a to have the same values for S and L,
and X and D, respectively.
11In the following three sections, analyzing the three main scenarios, we do not depict all the analyses
conducted for each of them. We rather focus on the most illustrative issues, in order to keep the paper as
compact as possible.
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structure of the model is different. However, some of the reasoning is similar, since Puga
(1999) looks at scenarios with and without migration, while the present analysis looks at cases
with and without commuting. To make this clear, the bifurcation diagram of Figure 2 showing
the core-periphery pattern for L-mobility is split into three parts12. Starting on the left at low
transport and commuting costs (until τ = γ ≈ 0.32), either a symmetric equilibrium or partial
agglomeration may occur13. In other words, the economy may either end up in a convergence
(i.e., the symmetric equilibrium), or in a divergence setting (i.e., the partially agglomerated
equilibrium). Which equilibrium prevails is determined endogenously (see Krugman’s ”history
matters” in Krugman, 1991a). At intermediate transport and commuting costs (0.32 / τ =
γ / 0.84), the only long-run stable equilibrium outcome is partial agglomeration, which is
fully in line with Puga’s (1999) results. This means, intermediate values of τ and γ for sure
lead to divergence between the two regions. Finally, high transport and commuting costs (from
τ = γ ≈ 0.84 onwards) lead to a weakly partially agglomerated equilibrium configuration with
weakening agglomeration as transport and commuting costs rise. The reason is that housing
costs rise as the agglomeration becomes larger, and may even outweigh the advantages of having
access to a large market, such that there are incentives for people to re-disperse. Thus, also
here we qualitatively obtain Puga’s (1999) results in a sense that high transport costs lead to
convergence across regions, since it makes sense for firms to serve their markets locally in
order to avoid transport costs. Except from the very right of this bifurcation diagram, here there
is no symmetric equilibrium, which is a result of the production technology assumptions and of
the introduction of commuting.
Rephrasing these results, the agglomeration patterns described above (see Figure 2) depict
the places of living of people. For instance, at equilibria with λLi = 0.5, half of the population
of unskilled workers live in each region, and also half of the skilled workers live in each region.
Enlarging the analysis, and using Figure 2 in combination with Figure 314, allows to identify
the places of work of people. For instance, if region i is small in terms of unskilled labor, about
8% of unskilled workers live and work in region i, and the remaining 92% in region j (see
Figure 2). Skilled workers are only allowed to commute in this first scenario. Our analysis
shows that more than 50% of the skilled workers of region i commute to region j, which means
that at least 75% of all skilled workers work in region j (see Figure 3, right panel)15. Thus, as
far as skilled workers are concerned, their places of living are dispersed, while their places of
work are quite agglomerated.
12In all the bifurcation diagrams, solid lines denote long-run stable equilibria, whereas dotted lines depict
unstable equilibria.
13Note that in the following we write ’τ = γ’ only because the simulations were run with simultaneous
changes of transport costs (τ) and commuting costs (γ).
14Figure 3 shows the commuting patterns for this scenario for both types of workers.
15All the figures depicting where commuting occurs (i.e. Figures 3, 8, and 11) only indicate whether there
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Figure 2: Core-periphery Pattern with Mobile Unskilled Labor and λS = λT = 0.5.
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Figure 3: L-commuters (left) and S -commuters (right) Corresponding to Figure 2.
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4.2 Commuters
In this scenario, L-workers only commute when their home region i is very large, whereas S -
workers commute when region i is small (in terms of the mobile factor L). Commuting is not
that important for L-workers since they also have the opportunity to migrate. Furthermore,
are commuters (the dark-grey areas) or not (the light-grey areas), they are not informative with respect to
commuting volumes or percentages. The percentages mentioned are taken out of the simulation results.
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unskilled labor wages are usually lower than skilled labor wages, and hence commuting costs
play a larger role. Thus, unskilled workers only decide to commute when region i is very large,
and hence housing cost are very high. Only up to 8% of unskilled workers commute. For S -
workers it makes sense to commute to region j if region i is small in terms of L, since in this
case, region j is the large one and thus requires a large amount of skilled workers in order to
produce all the services demanded (D-goods). That means, S -workers from region i receive a
higher wage in region j and additionally benefit from the comparatively low housing costs in
their home region. Hence, up to about 70% of skilled workers choose to commute.
Disallowing commuting for unskilled (skilled) workers, skilled (unskilled) workers com-
mute to a larger extent, where this increase is stronger for skilled workers. Of course, as com-
muting costs rise, the number of workers who commute decreases. Disallowing commuting
at all (see Figure 4), again leads to a replication of the bell-shaped agglomeration pattern of
Puga (1999). Here, there is a long-run stable symmetric equilibrium (i.e., convergence across
regions) both for low and prohibitively high transport and commuting costs (τ = γ / 0.32, as
well as τ = γ ' 0.97). The same core-periphery pattern occurs when disallowing S -commuting
only. This is due to fact that in the case of mobile L, L-commuting is of less importance, and
thus the difference between no commuting at all and no S -commuting only becomes unob-
servable. Subsequently, by disallowing L-commuting only, the qualitative results regarding
the core-periphery patterns obtained are the same as in the reference case with both types of
commuting being allowed.
Figure 4: Core-periphery Pattern Corresponding to Figure 2, Without Commuting
and λS = λT = 0.5.
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4.3 Agglomeration of Firms
Next, we look at the corresponding agglomeration of firms in each region in the long-run sta-
ble equilibria of the core-periphery patterns by computing the relative industry-shares for all
the three sectors (X, D, and Z). Still sticking to our unskilled labor mobility scenario, the im-
portance of commuting for all the three sectors is especially observable at lower transport and
commuting costs (until about τ = γ ≈ 1/3 of the goods price and of the nominal wage, respec-
tively). Note that this range of transport costs corresponds to the empirically relevant range of
these costs (see, e.g., Baier and Bergstand, 2001). Commuting affects the distribution of sectors
between the regions in a somewhat diverging way, in particular the service sector (see Figure 5).
This means, commuting induces the distribution of industries to be more unequal as the size of
the regions in terms of the mobile factor (unskilled labor in this case) varies. In other words, in
terms of production volumes, there is divergence. This is true at most values of λLi, whereas at
extreme differences in the size of regions, commuting leads to convergence (compare the left-
and righthand panel of Figure 5). At higher values of transport and commuting costs, this effect
diminishes since commuting becomes less attractive due to higher costs. As a result, industries
are generally less concentrated due to high transport costs. Thus, each region’s share of indus-
tries is higher than in the non-commuting scenarios. These observations hold true for all the
three economic sectors in the model. Since skilled workers may only commute but not migrate
in this scenario, this diverging effect of commuting is strongest for skilled workers and thus for
the service sector (see Figures 5 and 6)16,17.
Looking at the production values instead of production volumes, it turns out that the value
of the services and manufacturing goods produced is higher in the case where commuting is
allowed than in the non-commuting case, despite the lower production volumes.
5 Scenario 2: Skilled Labor Migration
In the case of mobile skilled labor, i.e., skilled labor is allowed both to migrate and to com-
mute, full agglomeration in one region is the only long-run stable equilibrium for all values of
transport costs (see Figure 7). That means, there is always divergence between regions, and the
symmetric (i.e., convergence) equilibrium always remains unstable. This is fully in line with the
higher degree of mobility, and with the observed agglomeration-tendency of skilled labor (see
for instance Egger et al., 2007; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002; Shields and Shields, 1989). Em-
pirically, not only the higher degree of mobility of skilled workers is observable, but also that
skilled workers are ready commute longer distances than unskilled workers (see for instance
16Note that we only show the graphs for the service sector, where the effect is largest.
17Figures 6, 9, and 12 depict the differences in production volumes for the three major scenarios between
cases where commuting is being allowed and cases without commuting. In all these diagrams, the light-
grey areas indicate that production volumes are higher when commuting is allowed. The opposite applies
for the medium-grey areas, whereas there are no differences in production volumes in the dark-grey areas.
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Figure 5: Volume of D-production in Region i with (left panel) and Without Commuters
(right panel), L mobile.
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Figure 6: Difference in D-production Volumes in Region i between the Left- and Righthand
Panels of Figure 5, L mobile.
1 99
R1
R99
Ĳ, Ȗ
ȜLi
Co¨rvers and Hensen, 2003; Kertesi, 2000). Skilled workers commute if their home region is
very large at decreasing rate as commuting costs rise, but with a constant fraction of up to 40%
of the skilled workers from region i (see Figure 8).
Comparing this to the non-commuting setting shows that disallowing commuting has no ef-
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Figure 7: Core-periphery Pattern with Mobile Skilled Labor and λL = λT = 0.5.
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Figure 8: S -commuters Corresponding to Figure 7.
1 99
R1
R99
Ĳ, Ȗ
ȜSi
fects on the resulting agglomeration structure. However, it has some impact on the distribution
of firms between the two regions. Without commuting, the distribution of firms becomes pro-
portional to the number of workers living in each region, just as in the non-commuting case for
unskilled labor mobility, while the full agglomeration core-periphery-pattern remains stable.
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This again confirms that introducing commuting into a NEG-model disentangles the agglomer-
ation of firms and people.
With mobile skilled labor (S ), however, there is a different result regarding the influence of
commuting on the agglomeration of firms and people than in the case of unskilled labor mobil-
ity. In terms of the production volumes of services (D), the possibility of commuting equalizes
the distribution of economic activity among regions (see Figure 9), since services are assumed
to be demanded locally. Figure 9 shows the differences in production volumes between the
Figure 9: Difference in D-production Volume in Region i between the Commuting and the
Non-commuting case, S mobile.
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case with commuting being allowed and the one with commuting being disallowed. Note that
the areas with positive or negative differences in production volumes between the commuting
and the non-commuting case (see Figure 9) corresponds exactly to those areas in the factor box
where skilled labor commuting occurs (see Figure 8). In other words, despite the agglomeration
of people in one region, production activities remain somewhat more dispersed as commuting
is introduced. Thus, also more peripheral regions are not left without any economic activity
in the agglomerated equilibria as in standard NEG, which also corresponds to the observed
job-decentralization by Cervero and Wu (1998). Furthermore, this result also provides some
potential for regional policy measures, such as the structural funds programs by the EU (see
also Gruber and Marattin, 2009, for regional policy applications of NEG).
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If the two regions are unequal in terms of their endowments with land (Ti = 0.4, T j = 0.6),
which represents what is usually associated with the ’size’ of a region, the share of S -commuters
increases slightly if the region with less T has the major part of the mobile factor (S , in this
case), but there are no significant qualitative changes. Accordingly, also the production volume
of services in the skilled labor scarce region increases slightly with a rising share of commuters.
The production of the agricultural good is more affected by unequal T -endowments, since land
is the only input in the Z-sector. Thus, the share of agricultural production in a region decreases
in a more pronounced way as the region hosts larger fractions of workers.
6 Scenario 3: Migration of all Workers
Using the same setup as before and allowing both types of labor to be mobile (i.e., to migrate),
a rather strong partial agglomeration develops at all values of transport and commuting costs,
while the symmetric equilibrium remains unstable. That means, the places of living of people
tend to be quite agglomerated, where especially skilled workers are concentrated in one region
(see Figure 10). Here, the intensity of agglomeration is over 90%, i.e. over 90% of the mobile
factor(s) are concentrated in one region which is due to the mobility of skilled labor.
Figure 10: Core-periphery Pattern with Mobile Skilled and Unskilled Labor and λT = 0.5.
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Looking at the importance of commuting, this scenario again confirms the different degrees
of mobility of skilled and unskilled labor (see Figure 11). Similarly to the previous scenario
with skilled labor mobility only, skilled workers commute to a larger extent as region i becomes
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large, whereas unskilled workers hardly commute. Again, this is mainly attributable to the
fact that if unskilled workers do not migrate at a larger scale, they demand services in their
respective home region, which in turn makes it attractive for skilled workers living in the larger
region to commute to the smaller region for producing services.
Figure 11: L-commuters (left) and S -commuters (right) Corresponding to Figure 10.
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Comparing this scenario to the previous two (see Sections 4 and 5) reveals that the impor-
tance of commuting decreases to some extent. However, it remains of significant importance in
the empirically relevant range of transport and commuting costs (i.e., up to about τ = γ ≈ 1/3).
This is illustrated by plotting the differences in production volumes of D- and X-goods between
the cases with commuting being allowed for all workers and commuting being disallowed for
all workers (see Figure 12). As in the previous scenarios, the areas with positive or negative dif-
ferences in production volumes in Figure 12 mirror those situations where commuting occurs.
Note that the production of services is higher in the case of commuting being allowed, whereas
the production of manufacturing goods is lower. Both is a result of skilled workers (i) living
in the larger region, which means they buy their manufacturing goods and some services there,
and (ii) are allowed to commute, which means they buy some of their services in the smaller
region and contribute to the smaller region’s production of services.
Again, also this scenario confirms empirical observations of (i) commuting becoming more
and more important due to decreasing ’pure’ transport costs, (ii) the tendency towards urban
agglomeration (see Anas, 2000), and (iii) local trends towards job decentralization and the
development of sub-centers in agglomerated areas (see Cervero and Wu, 1998).
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Figure 12: Difference in D-production Volume (left panel) and X-production Volume (right
panel) in Region i between the Commuting and the Non-commuting case, L and S mobile.
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Altering the initial endowments with land (Ti = 0.4, T j = 0.6), leads to interesting results.
Obviously, the production of agricultural goods is lower in the region with the smaller share
of land. Furthermore, also the production of services is lower in that region when it hosts the
major share of workers. This is due to the fact that there are less workers agglomerated due to
the smaller space available in that region, which also leads to higher housing costs as the degree
of agglomeration of workers increases. The small region in terms of T even shows decreasing
production volumes of manufacturing goods as a certain population threshold is passed (over
about 70% of the total population endowment). Recalling that X-goods production also requires
land as an input factor, scarce T becomes decisive in the production of X as many workers live
in that region, since the workers demand land too, in order to cover their housing needs.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
Investigating the robustness of our results, we discuss variations of the parameters α and β, the
income-expenditure shares for manufacturing goods and services, respectively, ρ, the technical
rate of substitution (TRS) between input factors for X- and D-production, and σ, the elasticity
of substitution between varieties of the manufacturing good. For every new parameter value, we
analyze the effects with respect to our reference cases for unskilled and skilled labor mobility,
as well as for the mobility of both types of labor. These reference cases correspond to Figures
2, 7, and 10.
As the economies become more services-oriented, i.e., lowering α while increasing β, the
agglomeration tendency increases, since services are region-specific goods. Hence, a higher
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income-share devoted to services leads to a higher demand of locally produced goods, and
to a more pronounced agglomeration pattern due to a higher degree of inward-migration and
commuting.
When changing the TRS between the input factors for the production of manufacturing
goods and services (ρ), we generally find that a lower ρ, hence a higher TRS, leads to less
pronounced agglomeration patterns, since the relatively scare production factor in one region
can be substituted more easily by the relatively abundant factor. This observation holds true for
all of our mobility-scenarios. Moreover, it is also valid in any counterfactual where commuting
is disallowed.
A higher substitutability between the varieties of the manufacturing good (σ) leads to a very
minor increase of the degree of agglomeration, whereas a lower σ shows the opposite effect.
This also holds true for all scenarios. The minor role played by changes of σ is due to the fact
that manufacturing goods make up only 40% of a consumer’s bundle of goods.
Furthermore, we run counterfactual scenarios of the model with a slightly altered model-
setup with respect to commuting costs. In the counterfactuals, we let γ assume fixed values (of
5, 20, 50, and 70% of the gross wage wLi and/or wS i, respectively), while leaving the introduc-
tion and simulation of transport costs (τ) unchanged, and controlled for all our three different
mobility scenarios. Basically, the qualitative properties of the agglomeration patterns in all the
scenarios remain valid (partial agglomeration in the L-mobility scenario, full agglomeration
with S -mobility, and strong partial agglomeration with S - and L-mobility), and the standard
NEG bifurcation diagrams could again be reproduced18. The results prove to be qualitatively
robust also with respect to the commuting patterns, and hence the importance of commuting in
the analyzed scenarios. These counterfactual scenarios with various fixed values of commuting
costs confirm the findings of Ottaviano et al. (2002), that any positive commuting costs lead to
divergence at low transport costs, while agglomeration is less sustainable or optimal as transport
costs become larger.
8 Conclusions
So far, New Economic Geography has mainly been dealing with the migration of workers,
which quantitatively seems to be of less empirical relevance than commuting. Commuting has
been of little importance in NEG (for the current state of research, see for instance the ap-
proaches in Murata and Thisse, 2005; Ottaviano et al., 2002; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2006), since
the scope of the NEG-models is somewhat larger, i.e., they are dealing with larger geograph-
ical units (regions or countries) where commuting tends to be of less importance. The urban
economics literature, on the other hand, extensively deals with commuting. Here, commuting
is viewed as occurring mainly inside cities, as for instance between residential zones and the
18In order not to overload the paper, we refrain from displaying the corresponding diagrams.
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CBD, or investigated in its importance in terms of city-structure and city-formation (see Abdel-
Rahman and Anas, 2004; Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002, for an overview). Murata
and Thisse (2005), Ottaviano et al. (2002), and Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) implement the urban
economics approach of modelling commuting in analytically solvable NEG-frameworks.
Our approach differs from the existing literature in several respects. It aims at sticking to
the NEG-literature in the line of Krugman (1991a,b) in terms of the modelling setup, while also
introducing the three main sectors of an economy, agriculture, manufacturing and services, in
order to obtain some hypotheses regarding the places of living and work of people, as well as
on the distribution of economic activities across regions. Thus, this paper contributes to the
suggestion of Fujita and Krugman (2004), to integrate urban features such as commuting into
geographical models.
The main result of our analyses is that the introduction of commuting and housing costs
into the NEG-model allows to disentangle the agglomeration of firms and people. Commuting
allows workers to continue living in agglomerations and enjoying the benefits of a larger product
variety, despite high housing costs, since they may choose to commute to another place (another
region) where they receive higher net-of-commuting-costs wages, which in turn enables them
to cover the high housing costs at their place of living. This observation is especially true for
skilled workers, who generally are more mobile than unskilled workers.
Summarizing the findings from the three scenarios with different mobility patterns (Sections
4−6), we are generally able to show that commuting is in fact an important feature in shaping
the agglomeration patterns of firms and people. We confirm several findings of Ottaviano et
al. (2002), Murata and Thisse (2005), and Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) regarding the influence
of commuting and transport costs on the resulting agglomeration structure. In contrast to the
cited literature, we are able to achieve those results (i) without forcing consumers/workers to
commute, and (ii) despite strong (or even full) agglomeration that might occur, the peripheral
region is not being left without any economic activity, as in standard NEG-models.
Furthermore, we are able to confirm some empirical findings regarding the development
of agglomerations. We show that the disentangling of the agglomeration of firms and peo-
ple depicts the observable patterns of job-decentralization and the formation of sub-centers in
agglomerated areas (see Cervero and Wu, 1998), while the trend towards agglomeration (of
people) in urban areas still prevails (see Anas, 2000).
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